China\u27s Belt and Road Initiative: Challenges for Arbitration in Asia by Norton, Patrick M.
 
CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE: 
CHALLENGES FOR ARBITRATION IN ASIA 
 
Patrick M. Norton*1 
 
 
Abstract:  The focus of international arbitration has begun to shift to 
Asia in the wake of that continent’s increasingly prominent role in 
cross-border trade and investment.  China’s ambitious Belt and 
Road Initiative (“BRI”)2 promises to exacerbate this trend.  The BRI 
will require a broad range of complex, inter-related commercial 
transactions with significant political and economic ramifications.  
These transactions can be expected to generate both commercial and 
investor-state disputes, principally in Asia, and many of these 
disputes will be submitted to arbitration.  This article considers the 
significant challenges that these developments will present for 
international arbitration. 
I. Arbitration’s Shift Toward Asia 
The number of international commercial arbitrations involving Asia 
has grown rapidly in recent decades, in pace with Asia’s greatly 
expanded role in international manufacturing, trade, and 
investment.3  Arbitration has become a favored option for dispute 
                                               
*1  The author is an independent arbitrator in the New York City area and a 
Member of Arbitration Chambers of Hong Kong and London.  He was formerly 
the managing partner of a major law firm’s Beijing office.  Prior to that, Mr. 
Norton served as the Assistant Legal Adviser for East Asian and Pacific Affairs at 
the U.S. Department of State and Counsel to the Senate Select Intelligence 
Committee. 
2  The BRI initiative is also sometimes referred to as the “One Belt One Road 
Initiative” (“OBOR”) based on a direct translation of its Chinese name, Yi Dai Yi 
Lu (一带一路)。   
3  See, Dr. Nicolas Wiegand & Dr. Tom C. Pröstler, Arbitration Is Becoming 
Increasingly Asian, BUS. L. MAG. (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.businesslaw-
magazine.com/2015/09/03/arbitration-is-becoming-increasingly-asian-there-are-
four-main-drivers-of-the-process/ [https://perma.cc/8UST-CNE3], (discussing the 
growth in the number of arbitrations in Asia and the reason behind the 
phenomenon). 
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resolution in Asia for the same reasons it has long been favored in 
its European and North American homelands:  arbitration 
proceedings offer a more neutral forum than national courts;  
arbitral proceedings are generally more confidential than judicial 
proceedings;  most importantly, arbitral awards are more readily 
enforceable than court judgments. 
Recent cultural developments in Asian business have facilitated the 
expansion of arbitration in Asia.  Three or four decades ago, Asian 
commerce was dominated by traditional business forms: Japan’s 
zaibatsu, Korea’s chaebol, and the family-run business empires of 
the Chinese diaspora.  China’s state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) 
were only beginning to explore trans-border commercial ventures.  
Most of these traditional and state-owned businesses were averse to 
compulsory third-party dispute resolution, preferring more 
confidential, face-saving negotiated solutions.  Today, most large 
Asian businesses, private and state-owned alike, have evolved into 
multinational corporations run by professional managers and 
advised by international counsel.  The companies’ managers and 
lawyers have often been educated abroad and have experience 
working in the international economy.  They deal regularly with 
business partners and competitors from other legal cultures and are 
familiar with international business practices, including the use of 
arbitration to resolve trans-border disputes. 
The recent increase in intra-Asian and Asia-related arbitrations is 
reflected in the experience of the major international arbitral 
institutions.  Most notably, the Hong Kong International Arbitration 
Centre (“HKIAC”) and the Singapore International Arbitration 
Centre (“SIAC”) have grown from local institutions in the 1980’s 
and 1990’s to among the world’s leading arbitral institutions today.  
Each administers hundreds of cases annually.4  The China 
                                               
4   Comparative statistics on the caseloads of arbitral institutions may be found on 
the Global Arbitration News (“GAR”) website.  International Arbitration 
Statistics 2016—Busy Times for Arbitral Institutions, GLOBAL ARB. NEWS (Jun. 
26, 2017), www.globalarbitrationnews.com [https://perma.cc/9HVW-RJRC].  
Statistics for the individual arbitral institutions may be found on their websites:  
HONG KONG INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CENTRE, www.hkiac.org 
[https://perma.cc/PE9T-7JKU];  SINGAPORE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
CENTRE, www.siac.org.sg [https://perma.cc/AKP5-W45C]. 
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74 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. [Vol. 13 
 
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission 
(“CIETAC”) regularly reports the largest number of international 
arbitrations of any arbitral institution in the world.5  The leading 
global arbitral institutions—the International Chamber of 
Commerce (“ICC”), London Court of International Arbitration 
(“LCIA”), and International Center for Dispute Resolution 
(“ICDR”)—all report a growing number of Asia-related cases, and 
in recent years each has established its own Asian offices to service 
the increased demand.6 
II. China’s Belt and Road Initiative 
A. An Economic Development Program of 
Unprecedented Ambition 
In 2013, China’s President Xi Jinping announced a program of 
Chinese investment abroad of remarkable scope and ambition.7  In 
                                               
5   International Arbitration Statistics, supra note 4; CHINA INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC AND TRADE ARBITRATION COMMISSION, www.cietac.org 
[https://perma.cc/RHL3-6NA4].  CIETAC has historically been the preferred 
Chinese institution for international disputes, but in recent years, other Chinese 
arbitral commissions, most notably the Beijing Arbitration Commission, have 
been competing for that business.  BEIJING ARBITRATION COMMISSION, 
www.bjac.org [https://perma.cc/SQ6X-D6NX]. 
6   The ICC opened a case-management office in Hong Kong in 2008 and plans to 
open a similar office in Singapore in mid-2018.  It has also established 
representative offices in Shanghai and Abu Dhabi.  The LCIA has affiliated 
offices in Singapore and New Delhi.  The ICDR now has an office in Singapore.  
A number of other arbitral institutions maintain a presence in Asia through 
various affiliations with Maxwell Chambers in Singapore.  Details may be found 
on the institutions’ respective websites. 
7   Xi first announced a “Silk Road Economic Belt” in a speech in Kazakhstan in 
September 2013.  The following month he announced a “21st Century Maritime 
Silk Road” in a speech to the Indonesian parliament.  In March 2015, the National 
Development and Reform Commission (“NRDC”), the Ministry of Commerce 
(“MOFCOM”), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (“MFA”), with the approval 
of the State Council, issued an overall mission statement for the BRI entitled 
“Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-
Century Maritime Silk Road.”  The website of China’s State Council provides a 
chronology of official developments in the evolution of the BRI up through April 
2015.  China to Play Bigger Intl Role: Blue Book, XINHUA (Apr. 2, 2015) 
http://english.gov.cn/news/top_news/2015/04/02/content_281475082023687.htm 
[https://perma.cc/9PQJ-BV9X].  Various other Chinese institutions associated 
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essence, China proposes to use the enormous foreign currency 
reserves generated in recent decades by China’s trade surpluses to 
finance infrastructure developments across the Eurasian continent 
and Southeast Asia.  China characterizes these developments as a 
resurrection of two historic trade routes linking China with the 
Middle East and Europe:8  the old “Silk Road” land routes, and the 
ancient maritime routes linking China with the Middle East and 
Europe via the sea lanes around Southeast and South Asia.9  China 
envisions the development of unified rail and road links across 
Central Asia and Russia into Europe; a network of commercial 
seaports across South Asia connecting to the Middle East, Africa, 
and Europe10; power projects to fuel development throughout the 
                                                                                                           
with the BRI also maintain specific web portals at which documentation 
concerning the BRI may be found, such as  the portals of the NRDC, 
http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/ [https://perma.cc/CF3M-JCCQ], and the Silk Road Fund, 
http://www.silkroadfund.com.cn [https://perma.cc/J79J-Y5FQ]. 
8   Overviews of the BRI and its development may be found in TOM MILLER, 
CHINA’S ASIAN DREAM: EMPIRE BUILDING ALONG THE NEW SILK ROAD 2017); 
Wang Xinsong, One Belt, One Road’s Governance Deficit Problem, FOREIGN 
AFF. (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia/2017-11-
17/one-belt-one-roads-governance-deficit-problem [https://perma.cc/G93B-
NXJY]; Olga Boltenko, Resolving Disputes Along the Belt and Road:  Are the 
Battle Lines Drawn? ASIAN DISPUTE REV. 190 (2017). 
9   Consistent with President Xi’s 2013 announcements,  Chinese officials and 
documents often speak of a “Silk Road Economic Belt” and a “21st-Century 
Maritime Silk Road.”  China to Play Bigger Intl Role: Blue Book, supra note 7.  
In fact, China envisions six-distinct “international economic cooperation 
corridors.“  Three are entirely overland.  The other three use various combinations 
of land and sea routes.  MILLER, supra note 8, at 22, 30-31; Boltenko , supra note 
8, at 192.  The original “Silk Road” also followed various routes across Asia, not 
a single trail.  MILLER, supra note 8, at 2. 
10 In July 2016, state-owned COSCO (the China Ocean Shipping Company) 
purchased a 51% controlling interest in the Port of Piraeus, Greece for $314 
million to serve as the European terminus of a BRI sea route from China to 
Europe via the Suez Canal and pledged to invest an additional $552 million to 
develop the port.  China Cosco to Invest Over $552 Million in Port of Piraeus, 
WALL STREET J., (July 6, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-cosco-to-
invest-over-552-million-in-port-of-piraeus-1467789308 [https://perma.cc/3KZD-
T6P8].  In November 2017, the Chinese-controlled Port of Piraeus entered into an 
agreement with the Shanghai International Port Group to cooperate in scheduling 
shipping between Shanghai and Piraeus.  Shanghai Port Teams Up with Greece’s 
Piraeus to Boost Container Traffic, REUTERS, (June 12, 2017), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/greece-cosco-sipg/shanghai-port-teams-up-with-
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol13/iss2/3
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region; and joint energy, mining, industrial, and agricultural 
projects.  Some development plans include East Africa as well, 
brought within the rubric of historic Chinese trading interests by 
invocations of the legendary sea voyages of Ming dynasty admiral 
Zheng Ho. 
The number and scale of potential BRI projects are unprecedented.11  
By 2016, only three years into the initiative, Chinese authorities 
estimated total BRI investments to date of $890 billion.12  In the 
spring of 2017, President Xi convened an international conference 
in Beijing to promote the BRI, at which he committed China to an 
additional $124 billion in funding for BRI projects.13  At that time, 
MOFCOM reported that more than 600 BRI-related contracts had 
already been signed,14 and Chinese news sources were reporting that 
50 Chinese state-owned enterprises (“SOE’s”) were already 
engaged in 1,700 BRI projects.15  In addition to greenfield projects, 
                                                                                                           
greeces-piraeus-to-boost-container-traffic-idUSL8N1J531W 
[https://perma.cc/UY4T-KMJD]. 
11   Reliable, consistent statistics on the BRI are elusive.  Various agencies and 
media sources publish data from time to time.  It is not always clear, however, 
what criteria they are using to identify projects for inclusion, and the numbers are 
therefore difficult to reconcile. 
12   James Kynge, How the Silk Road Plans Will Be Financed, FIN. TIMES, (May 
9, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/e83ced94-0bd8-11e6-9456-444ab5211a2f 
[https://perma.cc/VU5R-DCA6]. 
13   Another source suggests that, as of the May 2017 conference, China was 
“currently leading over US$926 billion worth of infrastructure projects under the 
BRI.  Sarah Grimmer & Christina Charemi, Dispute Resolution along the Belt 
and Road, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (May 22, 2017), 
https://globalarbitrationreview.com/chapter/1141929/dispute-resolution-along-
the-belt-and-road [https://perma.cc/JF7A-YJUH]. 
14   Investment and Cooperation Statistics along ‘One Belt and One Road’ 
Countries from January–February 2017, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, (Mar. 24, 2017), 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/statistic/foreigntradecooperation/201704/201
70402551454.shtml [https://perma.cc/R2PB-REVB]. 
15   SOEs Lead Infrastructure Push in 1,700 “Belt and Road” Projects, CAIXIN, 
(May 9, 2017), https://www.caixinglobal.com/2017-05-10/101088332.html 
[https://perma.cc/6R2G-N3F5].  Caixin quoted Xiao Yaoqing, the head of the 
State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (“SASAC”), as 
reporting that SOEs were then engaged in building: major high-speed highways in 
Kenya and Ethiopia and between China and Laos and Thailand; more than 60 
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Chinese corporations reportedly made $64 billion in BRI-related 
corporate acquisitions in 2016 and the first half of 2017.16 
The corporate and financial structures adopted for these projects 
necessarily vary widely, but the basic premise for the BRI is that 
Chinese corporations, public and private, will have a central role in 
their planning and implementation.  Chinese banks,17 in conjunction 
with financial institutions from other countries and international 
banks like the Asian Development Bank (“ADB”) and the Asia 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (“AIIB”), the latter of which is itself 
a Chinese-initiated project,18 will structure the financing.  Chinese 
construction companies will perform much of the construction, and 
Chinese corporations will assist in managing the resulting 
transportation, energy, power, and manufacturing facilities. 
This is not to say that participants in BRI projects will be 
exclusively Chinese.  China has made clear that it welcomes the 
participation of third countries and their commercial interests.  
                                                                                                           
energy projects along BRI routes; oil and gas pipelines from Russia, Kazakhstan, 
and Myanmar to China; and 56 industrial projects in various BRI countries. 
16   Chinese Investment along the Silk Road Is Soaring, WORLD ECON. F., 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/08/chinese-investment-along-the-silk-
road-is-soaring [https://perma.cc/R4MZ-LCUY]. 
17   China reportedly uses various financing institutions.  The most important are 
the policy banks, the China Development Bank, the China Exim Bank, and the 
Silk Road Fund, a private equity fund backed by China’s foreign reserves.  
China’s commercial banks also play a role.  MILLER, supra note 8, at 41-42. 
18   The AIIB was established at China’s initiative in January 2016 and was 
intended to play a key role in BRI financing.  In its initial year of operation, the 
AIIB approved BRI-related projects in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Uzbekistan, 
Pakistan, and Myanmar.  Most of these projects were jointly financed with the 
ADB or the World Bank.  Contrary to initial concerns, the AIIB’s projects have 
not been limited to BRI projects, and its operations have won kudos for 
transparency and conformity to operational standards at international banks.  Sara 
Hsu, How China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Fared Its First Year, 
FORBES (Jan. 14, 2017]; Wade Shepard, The Real Role of the AIIB in China’s 
New Silk Road, FORBES (July 15, 2017.  The Hsu and Shepard articles may be 
found on the Forbes website, www.forbes.com, under the authors’ names and the 
titles of the articles. Note that Shephard has a book on the BRI initiative 
scheduled to come out in the summer of 2018.  W. Shephard, On the New Silk 
Road:  Journeying Through China’s New Artery of Power (forthcoming, July, 
2018) 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol13/iss2/3
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Hong Kong19 and Singapore,20 natural gateways for international 
finance between China and other countries throughout the BRI 
region, have been particularly active in developing roles for 
themselves.  Third country involvement adds international technical 
and commercial expertise and helps spread the financial risks.  In 
December 2017, for example, Japanese Prime Minister Abe 
announced that the Japanese government would provide backing to 
private Japanese banks for the financing of BRI projects,21 and later 
in the same month GE Financial Services announced that it was 
partnering with China’s Silk Road Fund to establish an energy 
infrastructure investment platform.22 
B. Geopolitical Uncertainties 
BRI’s sheer scale has, from the outset, raised questions as to the 
initiative’s coherence.  China has suggested that more than 60 
countries will participate but has refused to put any geographic 
limits on BRI or require that participating countries enter into a 
common organization or treaty structure. 23  The only link among 
                                               
19   The Belt and Road Initiative, HONG KONG TRADE & DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL 
(“HKTDC”) (Sep. 13, 2017), http://china-trade--research.hktdc.com/business-
news/article/The-Belt-…itiative/The-Belt-and-Road-
Inititaive/obor/en/1/1X3CGF6L/1XOA36B7.htm [https://perma.cc/KJ3B-6NDZ].  
20   See Singapore ready to partner China to build Belt and Road, XINHUA,  
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-08/15/c_136528820.htm 
[https://perma.cc/UG7S-THCH] (reporting on statements by Singapore’s Minister 
of National Development and Second Minister for Finance on readiness of 
Singapore Government to cooperate with China on BRI projects). 
21   Japan to Help Finance China’s Belt and Road Projects, CNBC (Dec. 5, 
2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/05/japan-to-help-finance-chinas-belt-and-
road-projects.html [https://perma.cc/8RYQ-PPY2]. 
22  General Electric, China’s Silk Road Fund to Launch Energy Investment 
Platform, REUTERS (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trump-
asia-china-deals-ge/general…s-silk-road-fund-to-launch energy-investment-
platform-idUSKBN1DA057 [https://perma.cc/F87G-7MQW].  China’s State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (“SAFE”) announced that it had approved 
the deal and it would involve joint investments in electric power grids and new 
energy and oil and gas projects along the Belt and Road.  Id. 
23   Chinese sources typically refer to 67 or 68 countries.  SOEs Lead 
Infrastructure Push in 1,700 “Belt and Road” Projects, supra note 15.  At a press 
conference on April 18, 2017, however, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi 
refused to place limits on the countries that may be considered as coming within 
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many of the countries and projects on China’s lists is generally 
China’s own strategic and economic interests in fostering closer 
political and economic ties with as many countries on the Eurasian 
continent and East Africa as possible.  This diffuseness risks making 
the BRI incoherent—no more, perhaps, than a romantic sobriquet 
for all Chinese international economic expansion.  The absence of 
common cultures, legal systems, and geopolitical interests among 
the BRI participants also forms significant political obstacles to the 
emergence of common legal practices or institutions across the 
BRI’s extraordinary geographic scope. 
Some of the countries that China proposes to include in the BRI are 
also reluctant to enmesh themselves in economic projects that may 
be expected to further Chinese geopolitical interests.  India and 
Japan, China’s principal geopolitical rivals in Asia, have been 
especially reluctant to welcome China’s BRI advances and have put 
forward broad, Asia-wide investment programs of their own.24  
Others, smaller countries such as Myanmar and Vietnam, are often 
fearful of the embrace of their more powerful neighbor and have 
welcomed Chinese approaches with caution.25 
In some countries the BRI also raises unflattering analogies with 
earlier colonial or neo-colonial investment regimes.  Foreign—
whether European, American, or Chinese—investments and 
ongoing operational roles in the management of major 
transportation, resource, energy, or industrial projects inevitably 
generate mixed reactions from host governments and populations, 
which may welcome the projects initially but often come to resent 
                                                                                                           
the BRI.  He said that the BRI “should be open to all like-minded countries and 
regions,” and that China “has no intention of designating clear geographic 
boundaries for the Belt and Road.”  Id. 
24  Wade Shepard, India and Japan Join Forces to Counter China and Build Their 
Own New Silk Road, FORBES (July 31, 2017).  The article may be found at 
www.forbes.com under the author’s name and the article’s title.  See also,; Kai 
Schultz, Sri Lanka, Struggling with Debt, Hands a Major Port to China, N. Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/12/world/asia/sri-
lanka-china-port.html [https://perma.cc/6CY2-K65A]; MILLER, supra note 8, at 
180-86; But see Japan to Help Finance China’s Belt and Road Projects, supra 
note 21 (reporting Japan’s recent announcement that it may cooperate in funding 
some BRI projects). 
25   MILLER, supra note 8, at 127-35, 222-35. 
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foreign control, even partial, of important natural resources and key 
sectors of their economies. 
C. Tensions between Chinese Political and Commercial 
Interests 
There is also a fundamental tension in many projects between the 
Chinese Government’s geopolitical interests and the commercial 
criteria by which the Chinese parties to the transactions are 
ostensibly directed to conduct their business. 
Chinese authorities invariably repeat the mantra that BRI projects 
will be guided by “market principles.”26  Nevertheless, China’s 
broader political interests often, and unavoidably, intrude.  This is 
evident in many BRI projects from the outset, when the Chinese 
parties must assess the commercial risks of the project and the 
commercial terms that should be adopted in light of those risks.  
Many of the BRI projects are sited in countries characterized by 
political instability, undeveloped and unreliable legal systems, and a 
reputation for weak corporate governance, including corruption.27  
                                               
26   The Silk Road Fund’s BRI portal states that the “Fund makes investment 
decisions based on market principles, international practice and professional 
standard [sic].”  Overview, SILK ROAD FUND (last visited Apr. 8, 2018) 
http://www.silkroadfund.com.cn/enweb/23775/23767/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/U34H-ET53].  Similarly, the Chairman of the Export-Import 
Bank of China has said that “the bank always adheres to the market-oriented 
operating principle to fund the Belt and Road projects, stresses long-term 
investment and pays attention to risk control, in order to attain small but 
guaranteed profit as well as sustainable development.”  Bank Governors Vow 
Financial Support to Belt and Road Projects, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (May 18, 
2017), 
http://www.cdb.com.cn/English/xwzx_715/khdt/201709/t20170921_4597.html 
[https://perma.cc/98N8-D7G3]. 
27   Pinsent Masons has published a detailed analysis of the risk factors in each of 
44 BRI countries.  “One Belt, One Road”:  Mapping China’s Outbound Route, 
PINSENT MASONS, (Aug. 2016), 
https://www.pinsentmasons.com/PDF/2016/obor/OBOR-Pinsent_Masons-
2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XT4-ZY2Z].  Much of the data is drawn from: One 
Belt, One Road, THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENT UNIT (2016), 
http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=One-Belt-One-Road-
an-economic-roadmap-(Sep).pdf&mode=wp&campaignid=OBORSept2016 
[https://perma.cc/PSE8-E8EP]. 
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These would all be red flags to commercial investors, discouraging 
an investment altogether or requiring a higher rate of return to 
justify acceptance of the risks.  The Chinese Government, however, 
has geopolitical reasons for encouraging ambitious BRI projects 
despite such risks, and the Government retains de facto control over 
SOE decision-making, even in formally independent commercial 
entities.  Indeed, some reports suggest that Chinese officials 
anticipate losing up to 80% of their investment on BRI projects in 
Pakistan and 50% in Myanmar but proceed nevertheless because of 
China’s perceived geopolitical interests.28 
This tension between commercial and geopolitical interests 
encourages incautious investment decisions.  Chinese enterprise 
managers may well launch projects in the expectation that they will 
enjoy the potential benefits of their investment if it succeeds and 
that the Chinese Government will cover their losses if it fails.29  The 
sheer size of the BRI, moreover, makes it difficult for the central 
government to oversee and coordinate BRI projects.  Governmental 
decision-making is reportedly dispersed among various ministries 
and agencies that have their own agendas.30  Participation of 
provincial or local entities may also skew government decision-
making.  At those levels, the principal motivation for projects is 
often finding outlets for excess production at local manufacturing 
facilities (e.g., steel or cement) or justifying new facilities, all in the 
hope of preserving or expanding local employment.31 
C. Problems with BRI Projects 
                                               
28   Kynge cites a research analyst quoting Chinese officials privately admitting an 
expected 80% loss on projects in Pakistan.  Kynge, supra note 12. 
29   Wang cites a law firm study estimating that 30% of Chinese outbound 
investments fail because of unreliable risk analysis, and says that some SOEs 
falsify data to avoid scrutiny by government regulators.  Wang, supra note 8, at 7. 
30   Wang notes that in February 2015 the State Council established a Leading 
Small Group for Advancing the Work of Building the Belt and Road Initiative to 
oversee coordination of BRI projects among Chinese ministries.  He reports that 
this group has not been effective, the day-to-day coordination is conducted by the 
NRDC, and that much of the workload is borne by the Department of Western 
Region Development under the NRDC.  Id. at 6-7. 
31  WANG, supra note 8, at 6-7. 
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A number of BRI projects have already encountered problems 
arising in large part out of conflicts between the governments’ 
commercial and political interests. 
A series of BRI-related projects in Sri Lanka have long been 
controversial, involving allegations of corruption,32 criticized by 
opposition politicians as “playing geopolitics with national 
assets,”33 and generating anti-Chinese rioting.34  The criticism of 
China’s BRI investments in the country came to a head in December 
2017 when Sri Lanka was unable to repay a multi-billion dollar loan 
that had financed a BRI project to develop the strategic port of 
Hambantota.  As a result, Sri Lanka was forced to grant a 99-year 
lease on the port to Chinese interests.35  From a commercial 
standpoint, the foreclosure on the Hambantota loans was no more 
than a standard remedy exercised by a creditor when the debtor is 
unable to pay.  From a broader geopolitical standpoint, however, the 
transfer of a major national seaport to foreign control has generated 
further local opposition to Chinese projects in Sri Lanka generally.36 
China’s BRI projects with Pakistan have also been plagued 
by political controversy.37  The two countries have announced a 
broad range of BRI projects that are subsumed within the “China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor” (“CPEC”).38  A port project at 
Gwadar, however, has been forestalled by threats to the port from 
                                               
32  MILLER, supra note 8, at 186-95.  
33  Schultz, supra note 24. 
34  Wang, supra note 8, at 4-5;  James A. Dorsey, Asian Ports:  Pitfalls of China’s 
One Belt, One Road Initiative, THE WORLD POST (Feb. 28, 2017), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/asian-ports-pitfalls-of-chinas-one-belt-and-
one-road_us_58b0fc3fe4b0658fc20f955b [https://perma.cc/KRU5-ND3V]. 
35  Schultz, supra note 24. 
36  For China itself, the Hambantota lease also bears an ironic resemblance to 
China’s 19th century grant of a 99-year lease of Hong Kong to Britain when China 
was unable to pay its (admittedly questionable) Opium War debts. 
37 MILLER, supra note 8, at 174-80; Dorsey, supra note 34. 
38 The projects include the development of the port of Gwadar, the construction of 
a major roadway linking Gwadar and Western China along the Karakorum Road, 
the development of fresh water and waste water treatment plants, and the $14 
billion Diamer-Bhasha Dam. Information on the CPEC can be found on the 
“CPEC Portal” at www.cpecinfo.com [https://perma.cc/GVH6-2SNT].  The portal 
is maintained by the Pakistan China Institute and China Radio International. 
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domestic terrorists; road construction linking Gwadar to China’s 
Karakorum Highway has been delayed, reportedly as a result of 
Indian objections to construction near Kashmir; and Pakistan has 
rejected Chinese financing for the $14 billion Diamer-Bhasha Dam 
because Chinese parties reportedly wanted a security interest in the 
dam itself.39 
Problems have arisen elsewhere as well.  Nepal scrapped a $2.5 
billion hydroelectricity project because of alleged financial 
irregularities by the Chinese parties, and Myanmar halted a $3.6 
billion Chinese-backed dam.40  A $5.5 billion railway project in 
Indonesia remains in the planning stages five years after its 
inception, reportedly because the host government has been unable 
or unwilling to procure necessary land use rights.41  In the face of 
security threats, a Chinese SOE has effectively abandoned a copper 
mine in Afghanistan that it had purchased for $3.5 billion,42 and 
another Chinese SOE has abandoned a gold mine in Kyrgyzstan.43  
And in 2016 popular riots broke out in Kenya opposing Chinese 
construction of a railway project linking Mombasa and Nairobi.44 
 
 
                                               
39   Saibal Dasgupta & Anjana Pasricha, Pakistan, Nepal, Myanmar Back Away 
from Chinese Projects, VOICE OF AM. NEWS (Dec. 4, 2017), 
https://www.voanews.com/a/three-countries-withdraw-from-chinese-
projects/4148094.html [https://perma.cc/F7D3-NPU4]. 
40   Id. 
41   Wang, supra note 8, at 3. 
42   In 2009 Chinese companies obtained an Afghan Government concession to 
mine Mes Aynak, believed to be the second largest copper deposit in the world.  
The concession required the Chinese parties to build a power plant and a railway.  
Because of ongoing disputes over the contractual terms, no work has taken place 
under the concession.  Mohsin Amin, The Story Behind China’s Long-Stalled 
Mine in Afghanistan, THE DIPLOMAT (Jan. 7, 2017), 
https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/the-story-behind-chinas-long-stalled-mine-in-
afghanistan/ [https://perma.cc/MDV4-2974]; Boltenko, supra note 8, at 193. 
43   Zijin Mining Group Co., an SOE, had purchased the Kyrgyz gold mine shortly 
before the BRI was announced.  Zijin evacuated its employees and ceased 
operations after disputes over compliance with local environmental regulations 
and over Zijin’s tax liabilities.  Boltenko, supra note 8, at 193. 
44   Wang, supra note 8, at 4. 
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III. Commercial Disputes Under the BRI 
This rather extensive discussion of the political context in which 
BRI projects are initiated and implemented is necessary for an 
understanding of how commercial disputes arising out of these 
projects are likely to be resolved.  While some disputes will 
doubtless be handled on a purely commercial basis, the potential 
political and economic ramifications of the larger disputes will 
inevitably shape how the parties decide to handle them. 
A. A Complex Landscape of Inter-related, High 
Value Contracts 
There will be at least two basic sets of contracts for a typical BRI 
project: performance agreements to construct the railroad, port, 
industrial project, and underlying financing agreements.   There will 
be one or more Chinese parties and one or more host country parties 
to each set of agreements.  In some cases, third country corporations 
may also participate, and it is likely that many financing deals will 
involve international banks.   Some projects may also anticipate that 
the Chinese parties or their affiliates will play a role in operating the 
road, port, power plant, and others for a period of time after its 
completion.  All of these arrangements require multiple, inter-
related contracts among the performance, financing, and operating 
entities. 
On both the host country side and the Chinese side, the parties to the 
contractual agreements will often be joint ventures or special 
purpose vehicles incorporated in offshore jurisdictions.  
International banks and third country participants may also be party 
to some of these contracts, both on-shore and off-shore.  The host 
government, too, may be party to some agreements, e.g., 
performance guarantees, economic stabilization agreements, or land 
usage agreements.  These multi-level corporate structures and 
collateral government agreements add additional layers of potential 
contractual complexity. 
Many of these complex contractual structures will be of long 
duration.  Construction of many projects will undoubtedly take 
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years.  The financing may take various forms of debt or equity that 
will often be secured by the project’s later performance, for 
example, a share in revenues generated by a power plant or port 
duties received by the management of a seaport.  Repayment may 
be over a period of decades.  If the financing involves equity, 
Chinese parties may wind up holding equity positions in major 
infrastructure projects in the host country.  If, as in the Hambantota 
port project in Sri Lanka, parts of the physical plant serve as 
security for financing or for the local parties’ performance, those 
assets may be at risk of transfer to Chinese entities upon default.45 
The amounts in question will often be substantial.  Many of the 
individual projects to date (e.g., Gwador, Hambantota, the Diamer-
Bhasha Dam) are already measured in the billions.  Upon 
completion—and even during construction—the BRI projects will 
be significant factors in the local economy of the host country, and 
their success or failure will have broad economic and political 
implications both locally and internationally. 
In sum, the BRI can be expected to generate a very large number of 
complex international contracts among multiple parties from two or 
more jurisdictions involving billions of dollars in investments and 
performance over a period of years, if not decades.  Even if many of 
today’s proposed projects ultimately prove to be politically or 
commercially impracticable, the sheer scale of the BRI guarantees 
that a number of high-profile, large-value projects will go forward.  
These projects and the complex contractual structures they require 
will inevitably generate a significant number of contractual disputes. 
B. Dispute Resolution Options 
Commercial disputes arising out of the BRI may potentially be 
submitted to resolution in a broad range of judicial or arbitral fora.  
The complex circumstances of each contractual relationship and the 
host country’s laws will dictate some choices, but the parties 
themselves will typically enjoy considerable discretion in selecting 
and structuring dispute resolution procedures in their contracts. 
                                               
45 See supra text accompanying note 36. 
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1. Mediation 
Mediation remains a favored option for Asian parties that prefer 
non-adversarial, face-saving resolution of disputes.  It also provides 
a relatively inexpensive procedure that can be conducted 
confidentially and, if successful, may avoid expensive, drawn-out 
adversarial procedures later.  Because of the highly political context 
of many BRI projects, it is almost inevitable that many disputes will 
first be submitted to informal government-to-government 
discussions.  When the governments are not directly involved in the 
commercial disputes, those discussions are, as a practical matter, a 
form of informal “mediation,” and this kind of government-to-
government mediation may well be the most common form of 
dispute resolution for BRI projects generally. 
Whether BRI-related contracts will incorporate institutional 
mediation is less certain.  The International Academy of the Belt 
and Road, a research institution headquartered in Hong Kong,46 
issued a Blue Book Dispute Resolution Mechanism for the Belt and 
Road (the “Blue Book”) in October 2016.47  The Blue Book 
advocates a med/arb approach:  contractual stipulation that 
institutional mediation be held first, compulsory arbitration if the 
mediation fails.48  In September 2017, the Singapore International 
Mediation Centre (“SIMC”) and the China Council for the 
Promotion of International Trade (“CCPIT”) agreed to this approach 
and agreed to cooperate in facilitating institutional mediation of 
BRI-related disputes.49  The Hong Kong Government has also 
endorsed institutional mediation for BRI disputes.50 
                                               
46   International Academy of the Belt and Road, http://interbeltandroad.org 
[https://perma.cc/7JA9-ZM3J].  
47   Wang Guiguo, the Belt and Road Initiative in Quest for a Dispute Resolution 
Mechanism, 25 Asia Pacific L. Rev. 1, 1-16 (2017), 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10192557.2017.1321731?needAcc
ess=true#aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cudGFuZGZvbmxpbmUuY29tL2RvaS9wZGYvMT
AuMTA4MC8xMDE5MjU1Ny4yMDE3LjEzMjE3MzE/bmVlZEFjY2Vzcz10cn
VlQEBAMA== [https://doi.org/10.1080/10192557.2017.1321731]. 
48   Id; Boltenko, supra note 8, at 194. 
49   SIMC and CCPIT memorialized this agreement in a Memorandum of 
Understanding.   The Role of Mediation in the Resolution of Belt and Road 
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This med/arb approach seems most likely to be used in commercial 
contracts and disputes that do not engage significant government-to-
government political interests.  Where political interests are 
engaged, it is more likely that the parties will first raise the disputes 
to a political level and, if that proves unsuccessful, go directly to 
compulsory third-party resolution. 
2. National Courts 
Some disputes arising out of BRI contracts will doubtless be 
submitted to judicial resolution.  Certain disputes, e.g., real estate or 
tax disputes, may be subject to mandatory local laws and the 
mandatory jurisdiction of host country courts.  Offshore disputes 
among parties involved in BRI projects may also be subject to the 
jurisdiction of the parties’ home country courts.  For example, 
disputes among the Chinese parties to BRI financing agreements or 
between Chinese construction companies jointly constructing a road 
or a port may well be heard in Chinese courts.51  Chinese and third 
country parties to financing agreements for BRI projects may agree 
to submit their disputes to the courts and laws of the favored neutral 
jurisdictions in Asia—Hong Kong or Singapore—or even to the 
                                                                                                           
Disputes, HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS (Oct. 11, 2017), 
http://hsfnotes.com/asiadisputes/2017/10/11/the-role-of-mediation-in-the-
resolution-of-belt-and-road-disputes/ [https://perma.cc/2EFM-2Z37]. 
50   Hong Kong’s Secretary of Justice endorsed the Blue Book approach at a 
conference in Hong Kong also held in September 2017.  Id. 
51   The Supreme People’s Court has issued formal opinions directing Chinese 
courts to accommodate BRI-related disputes.  Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu 
Renmin Fayuan Wei “Yidai Yilu” Jianshe Tigong Sifa Fuwu He Baozhang De 
Nuogan Yijian (最高人民法院关于人民法院为“一带一路”建设提供司法服务
和保障的若干意见) [Several Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on 
Providing Judicial Services and Safeguards for the Construction of the ‘Belt and 
Road’ by People’s Courts] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Jun. 16 2015, 
effective Jun. 16, 2015) Sup. People’s Ct. Doc. No. 9 [2015], Jun. 6, 2015, 
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=251003&lib=law [https://perma.cc/2J7M-
CSDM].  The 2015 Opinions are general admonitions to the lower courts to 
facilitate the handling of cases involving the BRI and to recognize its importance 
as a matter of national policy.  It is unclear what practical effects they will have in 
Chinese judicial proceedings.  Nor is it clear whether they are intended to enhance 
the role of Chinese courts in handling BRI disputes, although the courts are 
directed, according to section I(2), to “actively carry out international judicial 
cooperation with countries along the ‘Belt and Road’ ….” 
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more prominent international jurisdictions such as London or New 
York. The courts in all of these jurisdictions have longstanding 
experience in dealing with international transactions, and their laws 
are often tailored to accommodate adjudication of such disputes in 
their courts. 
The Chinese and host country entities party to the core BRI 
financing and performance agreements will be disinclined, however, 
to submit willingly to the jurisdiction of each other’s courts.  Many 
of the host countries for BRI investments have relatively new 
judicial systems with limited experience in adjudicating complex 
international commercial disputes and, of equal significance, a 
limited record of political independence.  It is difficult to imagine 
Chinese companies willingly submitting to their jurisdiction.  
Conversely, China’s courts have a long history of political 
interference in judicial decision-making when, as will often be the 
case with BRI projects, the disputes have significant political or 
economic ramifications.  It is, therefore, equally difficult to foresee 
host country parties to BRI contracts accepting Chinese choice-of-
forum clauses. 52 
The solution to this impasse, as with most international contracts, 
will be arbitration.  China itself has already endorsed arbitration as 
the appropriate method of dispute resolution for BRI projects,53 and 
host country parties can generally be expected to acquiesce in the 
inclusion of arbitration clauses in their contracts as the most 
practicable means of finding a neutral forum. 
                                               
52   China has also recently suggested that it is considering the establishment of a 
Chinese international court for BRI disputes along the lines of the Singapore 
International Commercial Court or the Dubai International Financial Centre.  
Both of those courts employ international judges.  The Role of Mediation in the 
Resolution of Belt and Road Disputes, supra note 49, at 3-4.  I am inclined to 
doubt that the Chinese Government would accept such an arrangement. 
53 China’s endorsement of arbitration for BRI disputes has generally taken the 
form of statements by officials at various international conferences.  The Vice 
President of the Supreme People’s Court, He Rong, for example, stated at a 
conference in Hong Kong that “[t]he Supreme People’s Court is committed to 
supporting Hong Kong as the international dispute resolution centre for the One 
Belt One Road initiative ….”  Grimmer & Charemi, supra note 13, at 5. 
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3. Arbitration Options for BRI Projects 
Arbitration clauses in international contracts require two basic 
choices:  venue and an administering arbitral institution.  Each is 
important for different, albeit related, reasons. 
a. Venues 
Choosing an appropriate venue for an international arbitration 
involves three basic issues:  (1) being sure that local laws 
reasonably support arbitration and that local courts will therefore 
support, and not unreasonably interfere with, the conduct of the 
arbitration; (2) confirming that the host country is party to the New 
York Convention54 in order to ensure that the resulting award will 
be enforceable; and (3) being sure that appropriate logistical support 
for the arbitration proceeding—international airline access, hearing 
facilities, translation facilities—will be available. 
The favored jurisdictions for disputes arising out of BRI projects in 
South and Southeast Asia will almost certainly be Hong Kong and 
Singapore, each of which is already a highly successful venue for 
international commercial arbitration and meets these criteria.  Each 
has a well-established legal system with a record of independent 
courts and legislative and judicial support for arbitration55; each is 
party to the New York Convention56; and each has excellent 
                                               
54  The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, New York, Jun. 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (1959). 
55 Non-Chinese parties sometimes avoid Hong Kong as a venue for arbitration out 
of concern that, as a part of China, Hong Kong’s judicial or arbitral proceedings 
are potentially subject to interference by Mainland Chinese authorities.  This risk 
cannot be dismissed entirely, but under the “one country, two systems” 
arrangements that implemented Hong Kong’s reversion to Chinese sovereignty in 
1997, such intervention is highly improbable because of the broader political 
repercussions for China of ignoring Hong Kong’s independence in such matters.  
In the present context, China itself has a significant additional interest in 
continuing the independence of Hong Kong’s judicial and arbitral institutions as 
leading fora for resolving BRI-related disputes. 
56   Because Hong Kong is now a part of China, it is no longer eligible to be a 
party to the New York Convention.  Hong Kong and China therefore 
implemented in 1999 an “Arrangement Concerning Mutual Enforcement of 
Arbitral Awards between the Mainland and the Hong Kong Special 
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logistical facilities, including Chinese language translation capacity, 
a potentially critical consideration for projects that involve Chinese 
parties.  Hong Kong and Singapore are also venues generally 
acceptable to the Chinese Government57 and Chinese commercial 
entities. 
Outside of South and Southeast Asia, the choices for BRI projects 
are less certain.  A variety of potential venues have adequate 
logistical facilities, though only a few have dedicated arbitration 
centers and very few have adequate Chinese language support.  
Many of the BRI countries have enacted versions of the 
UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law,58 and most are, like China, 
also party to the New York Convention.  Few, however, have 
experience in actually hosting international arbitrations and a 
limited record, at best, of having awards rendered in their territory 
enforced elsewhere under the Convention.  Undoubtedly, various 
regional arbitration institutions will try to attract arbitrations 
concerning BRI projects within their geographic ambits.  It remains 
to be seen what success they will have. 
Projects in countries outside the geographical orbits of Hong Kong 
or Singapore may prefer to site their arbitrations in traditional 
venues such as London, Paris, Zurich, Geneva, Stockholm, or New 
York.  Each offers a neutral site with generally supportive local 
laws, excellent logistical facilities, and a track record of enforceable 
awards.  On the other hand, the traditional venues are 
geographically distant from the BRI region and typically expensive.  
These may prove disincentives in some cases. 
                                                                                                           
Administrative Region.”  Arrangement Concerning Mutual Enforcement of 
Arbitral Awards Between the Mainland and the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
https://www.doj.gov.hk/eng/mainland/pdf/mainlandmutual2e.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZDC7-BZQE].  This “arrangement” provides terms for mutual 
enforcement of awards similar to those available under the New York Convention 
and appears to be working quite well. 
57   See supra, text accompanying note 55. 
58   UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, adopted by 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”), UN 
Doc A/40/17, Annex I (June 21, 1985).  Revisions to the UNCITRAL Model Law 
were adopted by the United Nations in December 2006.  Texts of the Model Law 
and the Revised Model Law are available at www.uncitral.org. 
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b. Arbitral Institutions 
Several independent arbitral institutions now administer the large 
majority of international arbitrations.  Each has its own rules and 
procedures.  Although the differences among the institutional rules 
may be consequential in some cases, the rules of the leading 
institutions are increasingly congruent and are likely to influence 
only marginally the selection of the arbitral institution in a 
contractual arbitration clause.  For present purposes the more 
significant factors in designating the administering institution are 
likely to be geographic proximity and institutional credibility. 
The HKIAC and SIAC are already among the leading arbitral 
institutions worldwide, and, as discussed above, each is 
headquartered in a favorable venue.  Both the HKIAC and the SIAC 
seem almost certain, therefore, to attract a large share of arbitrations 
arising out of BRI projects in South and Southeast Asia and, to a 
lesser extent, beyond.  Well-established international institutions 
such as the ICC, LCIA, and ICDR have also taken steps to enhance 
their ability to service Asia-based or Asia-related arbitrations, 
including the establishment of offices in Hong Kong or Singapore 
that makes it easier to service arbitrations sited in those venues.  All 
of these institutions are viable options for administering arbitrations 
arising out of disputes in BRI projects in South or Southeast Asia. 
Outside of that region, it seems most likely that the leading global 
institutions—again, the ICC, LCIA, ICDR, perhaps the Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce (“SCC”) or the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration (“PCA”)—will dominate the field.  As a result of their 
experience in administering complex international arbitrations, the 
established arbitral institutions enjoy significant commercial 
credibility that enhances the likelihood of their incorporation in 
arbitration clauses.  When the parties to an international contract, 
including a BRI-related contract, are negotiating a choice-of-forum 
clause, it will be difficult to refuse to agree to a well-known arbitral 
institution such as the ICC, the HKIAC, or the SIAC. 
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Local or regional organizations are also emerging in particular 
regions,59 anticipating at least regionally-focused business.  Ad hoc 
arbitration60 of BRI-related disputes is also a possibility, but the 
award of an ad hoc tribunal lacks the imprimatur of an award 
rendered by one of the more established institutions.  Ad hoc 
arbitration, moreover, is barred in China, and because they have 
little experience using it, Chinese parties and counsel may resist its 
inclusion in contractual arbitration clauses. 
4. China as the Venue for BRI Arbitrations 
The Chinese Government and Chinese arbitral institutions are 
taking measures to facilitate the holding of BRI-related arbitrations 
in China.61  This is hardly surprising.  Logistical facilities in the 
major Chinese cities now meet international standards, and China 
has long been party to the New York Convention.  The Chinese 
parties to BRI contracts will also undoubtedly feel more 
                                               
59 The most successful regional arbitration centers to date include the Asia 
International Arbitration Centre, www.aiac.world (formerly the Kuala Lumpur 
Regional Centre for Arbitration]; the Dubai International Arbitration Centre, 
www.diac.ae [https://perma.cc/8NG7-97XD]; and the Cairo Regional Centre for 
International Commercial Arbitration, www.crcica.org [https://perma.cc/X7TW-
4LYJ].  Each will be a credible candidate for BRI-related disputes within their 
particular geographic areas. 
60 Most likely under UNCITRAL Rules, which have an appealing neutrality and 
an established record of application in cases potentially involving political issues, 
e.g., investor-state disputes.  For the sake of convenience and to ensure that the 
procedures for appointment of arbitrators will function appropriately, the parties 
to an agreement specifying the application of UNCITRAL Rules typically also 
specify that the arbitration be administered by an established arbitral institution.  
Most of the established arbitral institutions have procedures anticipating this kind 
of administrative arrangement. 
61   In October 2016, for example, the Wuhan Arbitration Commission, one of 
more than 200 local arbitration commissions in China, announced the 
establishment of a “‘One Belt, One Road’ Arbitration Court” to “govern disputes 
involving Chinese enterprises.”  The new President of the OBOR Arbitration 
Court said that they anticipated that most projects would involve infrastructure 
construction.  China establishes “One Belt, One Road” Arbitration Court, 
WHERE CHINA MEETS THE WORLD, http://www.chinagoabroad 
com/en/article/21685 [https://perma.cc/2QGG-58DF].  This sounds as though the 
contemplated disputes are intra-Chinese, and Wuhan is an improbable venue for 
international cases, but it is not out of the question that the new “Arbitration 
Court” would also seek cases between Chinese and host country parties. 
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comfortable in their home territory with institutions that are familiar 
with Chinese business practices and are accustomed to conducting 
proceedings in Chinese.  Some may also feel that because Chinese 
institutions are generally funding the projects, the use of Chinese 
venues and arbitral institutions is appropriate. 
As with Chinese courts, however, one must be skeptical as to the 
likely success of these efforts.  Chinese parties undoubtedly will 
have leverage in many BRI negotiations, and some may try to use 
that leverage to dictate Chinese choice-of-forum clauses.  By 
definition, however, Chinese venues and Chinese arbitral 
institutions will not be “neutral” for BRI-related disputes.  Doubts 
also persist as to the willingness of Chinese courts to support 
arbitration under difficult political circumstances.62  The neutral 
venues and administering institutions discussed above seem more 
likely, therefore, to prove mutually acceptable in most BRI contract 
negotiations. 
C. BRI’s Legal Challenges for Commercial 
Arbitration in Asia 
1. Arbitrating Highly Political Disputes 
The potential political ramifications of arbitrations arising out of 
BRI projects cast a shadow over the process generally. 
Arbitration has previously handled, with reasonable success, a 
number of prominent arbitrations involving substantial foreign 
investments, although primarily in the context of investor-state 
arbitration (discussed below).  The sheer number and scale of 
potential BRI disputes present institutional problems of a different 
order.  Many BRI disputes may well involve hundreds of millions or 
even billions of US dollars.  If a number of awards of this 
magnitude are rendered in prominent BRI-related cases over a short 
                                               
62   Chinese courts are still subject to the guidance of legal/political committees of 
the Chinese Communist Party.  In most circumstances these committees will have 
an incentive to encourage Chinese venues by directing local courts to provide the 
necessary support to arbitration.  Nevertheless, some BRI projects will raise 
significant economic or political considerations that may override this incentive. 
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period, the adequacy and appropriateness of the institution itself 
may be questioned.  This will be all the more so if the awards, for 
good reason or bad, generally favor one side or the other, i.e. if they 
generally run in favor of the Chinese investors or in favor of their 
counter-parties in the host country. 
There is, moreover, a risk or indeed, a likelihood, that the parties to 
BRI-related disputes will follow the practice, already common 
elsewhere, whereby each party to a commercial arbitration appoints 
an arbitrator of its own nationality to the arbitral panel, leaving the 
outcome of a case—in appearance, if not always in practice—in the 
hands of an individual, “neutral” chairman.63  The potential size and 
number of many BRI projects risk magnifying the political 
consequences of this approach.  China and host counties alike may 
find unsatisfactory a system in which legal disputes arising out of 
high-profile BRI projects are being resolved by a relatively small 
number of independent neutral arbitrators operating under the 
auspices of independent, non-governmental arbitral institutions. 
2. Institutional Capacity 
A related issue is the capacity of independent arbitral institutions, 
individually and collectively, to manage a significantly expanded 
caseload.  It is impossible to anticipate how rapidly the volume of 
BRI-related arbitrations will increase.  If the increase is relatively 
gradual, it may be that the adjustments necessary to accommodate 
BRI-related arbitrations will not be too difficult.  The leading 
arbitral institutions already have extensive experience administering 
large caseloads, and one assumes that they will be able to adjust to 
larger caseloads if the rate of increase is not too great.  
Nevertheless, international arbitration for non-BRI cases is itself 
increasing quite rapidly, particularly in Asia, and it is quite possible 
that an additional increase from the BRI may challenge the 
administrative capacity of the institutions. 
                                               
63   JAN PAULSSON, THE IDEA OF ARBITRATION 276 (2013).  Paulsson himself has 
long been a critic of the standard practice by which each party to a commercial 
arbitration is typically allowed to nominate one member of a three-arbitrator 
panel. 
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The most significant practical problem may be the size of the 
available arbitrator pool.  All of the institutional arbitrations tend to 
draw on a common pool of arbitrators.  The current pool of 
arbitrators with the legal and cultural experience desirable for 
handling complex commercial disputes in Asia is quite limited.  The 
pool of arbitrators with experience in handling disputes involving 
more than, say, $100 million, is even smaller.  A frequent criticism 
of international arbitration, moreover, in Asia as elsewhere, is that 
reliance on this limited pool is overloading individual arbitrators’ 
caseloads and causing serious delays in the resolution of cases and 
rendering of awards.  The potential volume of the BRI caseload and 
the magnitude of potential awards is, again, the issue.  An 
increasing volume of arbitrations arising out of large, complex BRI 
projects can only be expected to exacerbate these problems. 
This capacity problem may, of course, be ameliorated by expanding 
the pool of arbitrators.  The number of talented young lawyers 
engaged in international arbitration has increased dramatically in 
recent years, especially in Asia.  If the BRI-related caseload does 
not expand too rapidly, a sufficient number of new arbitrators may 
well emerge to handle it.  The addition of a substantial number of 
arbitrators from China and BRI host countries would have the 
additional advantage of enhancing the diversity of the arbitrator 
pool. 64 
At least in the short term, however, the potential institutional 
capacity problem, conjoined with the political implications of 
placing decision-making authority in the hands of a relatively small 
number of neutral arbitrators, may cause some to question the 
political wisdom of consigning commercial disputes arising out of 
BRI projects to independent arbitral institutions. 
3. Complex, Inter-related Contractual Disputes 
Administered by Different Arbitral Institutions or Courts 
                                               
64 The ICC has already anticipated this issue by initiating ambitious training 
programs for new arbitrators in Asia, and it would be surprising if the 
governments and arbitral institutions involved in the BRI did not follow this 
example. 
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More technical legal problems may arise from the potential 
complexity of BRI disputes.  As discussed above, many BRI 
projects are likely to involve several layers of inter-related contracts 
among a variety of parties.  These contracts will often include 
inconsistent choice-of-forum clauses.  This is not, of course, a new 
or unique problem.  Many international commercial projects involve 
a multitude of inter-related contracts among diverse parties, and 
legal proceedings in different fora often proceed in parallel.  These 
situations typically raise a range of difficult issues:  when may 
related cases before the same institution be consolidated?  When 
may proceedings in different fora be conjoined?  What legal effect 
does a judgment or award in one proceeding have on the legal or 
factual issues in another?  The size and complexity of BRI projects 
may be expected to magnify problems of this nature. 
In recent years the leading arbitral institutions have developed 
procedures for consolidating related cases and permitting, or 
sometimes requiring, the joinder of third parties to contractual 
disputes.  These procedures apply, however, only when the 
arbitration clauses of the contracts at issue specify the same 
administering institution.  It is much more challenging to manage 
disputes arising out of inter-related contracts whose arbitration 
clauses stipulate different rules, different institutions, and different 
national venues:  these are precisely the circumstances that may 
well be found in many BRI-related disputes. 
The SIAC has recently put forward a proposal for establishing in 
advance a protocol among the various arbitral institutions to 
cooperate in the consolidation of inter-related disputes arising out of 
contracts with arbitration clauses that stipulate different arbitral 
institutions.65  The SIAC proposal is not aimed at BRI disputes, but 
it encompasses the kinds of problems that may be presented in many 
of those disputes.66  It remains to be seen if this proposal or some 
                                               
65  Singapore International Arbitration Centre, Proposal on Cross-Institutional 
Consolidation Protocol, (Dec. 19, 2017), http://siac.org.sg/69-siac-news/551-
proposal-on-cross-institution-consolidation-protocol [https://perma.cc/5XVB-
7ZPR]. 
66  This kind of cooperation would raise a number of difficult jurisdictional 
problems. 
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variation of it can be agreed and, if so, to what extent it would 
mitigate these problems. 
4. Identifying and Applying Applicable Law 
For commercial arbitral tribunals hearing BRI-related disputes, the 
most difficult issues may involve identifying and applying 
unfamiliar or undeveloped laws.  The laws of many BRI host 
countries are of relatively recent origin and may not fully, or clearly, 
address issues relevant to transnational infrastructure development 
projects.  China’s laws, too, have only been promulgated relatively 
recently and still include areas of uncertainty.  More fundamentally, 
the laws of China and the various BRI states arise out of quite 
different, and often incongruent, legal systems.  China’s commercial 
laws are essentially civil in origin.  The laws of the host countries 
for BRI projects rest on a broad range of common law, civil law, 
customary law, or sharia systems. 
The parties to BRI contracts will, of course, try to obviate these 
problems in their contracts, specifying applicable laws and 
providing detailed terms intended to govern the most significant 
issues anticipated by the parties.  For their part, arbitral tribunals can 
be expected to adhere as closely as possible to the terms of the 
applicable contracts and try, whenever possible, to avoid the more 
difficult conflict of law issues.  Chinese and many host country 
parties, however, often prefer imprecise, more flexible contract 
terms, and they may also stipulate applicable laws that will be 
difficult to prove or interpret.  Even the most sophisticated 
contracts, moreover, fail to anticipate all difficulties that may arise; 
indeed, they sometimes intentionally leave difficult issues open.  In 
short, when the choice of law is uncertain and the applicable law is 
undeveloped, tribunals will face significant difficulties identifying, 
interpreting, and applying rules of law. 
These problems, too, are not new or unique.  Many international 
tribunals already deal with similar issues.  Again, however, the 
number and magnitude of BRI-related cases may be expected to 
complicate these issues.  It is more than likely that the terms of BRI 
contracts will be uncertain, it will be difficult to prove the content of 
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applicable law in many cases, and BRI tribunals may be required to 
render rulings on local law that is not clearly established or is 
subject to disputing views. 67 
IV. State-to-State and Investor-State Disputes 
Most BRI projects will be initiated by, and conducted under the 
auspices of, inter-governmental agreements between the Chinese 
and host country governments.  This raises the likelihood of both 
state-to-state and investor-state legal disputes to which different 
laws apply and which may be resolved by different institutions and 
procedures. 
A. State-to-State Disputes 
Under customary international law, a state may “espouse” claims of 
its nationals68 for treatment that amounts to a denial of justice69 or 
violation of international minimum standards.70  In the BRI context, 
China would be entitled to espouse the claims of Chinese investors 
for treatment by the host country violating these customary 
international law standards.  Third countries whose nationals were 
                                               
67 Some have speculated whether, under these circumstances, particular laws or 
procedures common among BRI cases may evolve a sort of “BRI law.”  It seems 
possible that some of the Chinese entities involved in BRI contracts will try to 
standardize their contracts across jurisdictions and that lawyers involved in 
preparing BRI contracts will borrow from other, publicly available contracts for 
the sake of convenience, if nothing else.  It is possible, too, that arbitral tribunals 
may borrow general principles or standards of law from the rulings of other 
tribunals to legitimize their own rulings on otherwise novel issues of law.  At this 
point, however, developments of this sort must remain highly speculative.  The 
divergence of legal systems potentially involved is simply too great to expect 
ready consolidation of practice either at the contracting level or in adjudicatory 
proceedings. 
68   The right of espousal is a function of the more general right of diplomatic 
protection that a state may exercise on behalf of its nationals.  BRIERLY’S LAW OF 
NATIONS 255 (Andrew Clapham ed., 7th ed. 2012). 
69   See generally, JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2005) (examining modern understanding of denial of justice). 
70   See generally, MARTINS PAPARINSKIS, THE INTERNATIONAL MINIMUM 
STANDARD AND FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT (2013) (providing a holistic 
analysis of minimum standard and fair and equitable treatment in investment 
protection treaties). 
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involved in the projects would enjoy similar rights.  If the 
governments agreed, such state-to-state claims could be referred to 
the International Court of Justice or ad hoc tribunals. 
In the BRI context, however, claims of this nature are largely 
theoretical.  China has never shown an inclination to submit its 
claims under customary international law to third-party dispute 
resolution.  China is much more likely to seek to resolve disputes of 
this nature in diplomatic channels, where it can better exercise its 
political and economic leverage.  State-to-state legal claims, if 
invoked at all, will be a secondary factor in China’s diplomatic 
positions. 
B. Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
More likely for BRI projects are disputes of the kind that arise in an 
investor-state dispute settlement (“ISDS”) context:  regulatory 
actions by the host government adverse to the interests of foreign 
investors that allegedly constitute compensable expropriations of 
property of the foreign investor or violations of economic 
stabilization clauses; claims that the host state has failed to provide 
the foreign investor “fair and equitable” treatment or “full protection 
and security”; failure of the host state to provide “national 
treatment”; and others.  In recent decades a broad array of states 
have entered into more than 3,300 multilateral and bilateral 
international investment agreements (“IIAs”) authorizing the 
foreign investor to bring claims of this nature directly to investor-
state arbitration tribunals, typically pursuant to the ICSID 
Convention71 and ICSID Rules.72 
Whether disputes of this nature arising out of BRI projects may be 
submitted to investor-state arbitration will depend on the terms of 
China’s bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) with host 
                                               
71 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159. 
72   World Investment Report 2017:  Investment and the Digital Economy, UNITED 
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD), 111 (2017), 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2017_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/UL3Q-
Z3E7]. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol13/iss2/3
100 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. [Vol. 13 
 
governments.  China is already party to 128 such agreements,73 
including many with BRI countries.74  Until recent years, however, 
China has primarily been a capital-importing country, and one of its 
principal policies in entering into BITs has been to limit its potential 
legal exposure to the claims of foreign investors in China.  As a 
consequence, China’s earlier BITS, while providing some 
guarantees to foreign investors, do not generally authorize investor-
state arbitration, or they limit arbitration to valuation issues for 
expropriations and exclude questions of liability, effectively 
curtailing their utility.75  Most of China’s BITs with BRI countries 
are of this nature.76 
In recent years, however, China has emerged as one of the world’s 
leading capital exporters, and it has a larger, and rapidly growing, 
interest in protecting China’s own investors abroad.  This may 
explain the inclusion in more recent Chinese BITs of clauses that do 
generally authorize investor-state arbitration, and Chinese parties 
have already begun to bring claims under those clauses.77 
The intriguing question is whether, in the light of the expected 
increase of claims by Chinese investors arising out of BRI projects, 
China will begin negotiating new BITs with BRI states, or 
amending existing BITs, to permit those investors to bring their 
                                               
73 Database for Bilateral Investment Treaties, WORLD BANK GROUP, (last visited 
Apr. 8, 2018) https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/resources/Bilateral-
Investment-Treaties-Database.aspx#a33 [https://perma.cc/VQJ2-6JJN]. 
74 Vivienne Bath, “One Belt, One Road” and Chinese Investment, OXFORD BUS. 
L. BLOG (Jan. 5, 2017), https:www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-
blog/blog/2017/01/’one-belt-one-road’-and-chinese-investment 
[https://perma.cc/3HG4-LCXL]. 
75 Kate Hadley, Do China’s BITS Matter? Assessing the Effect of China’s 
Investment Agreements over Foreign Direct Investment Flows, Investors’ Rights, 
and the Rule of Law, 45 GEORGETOWN J. INT’L L. 255, 303-04 (2013). 
76 Bath, supra note 74. 
77 Ping An Life Insurance Company, Limited and Ping An Insurance (Group) 
Company, Limited v. The Government of Belgium, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/29, 
in favor of State (Apr. 30, 2015); Señor Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, in favor of Investor, (July 7, 2011); Beijing Shougang 
Mining Investment Company Ltd., China Heilongjiang International Economic & 
Technical Cooperative Corp., and Qinhuangdaoshi Qinlong International 
Industrial Co. Ltd. v. Mongolia, Perm. Ct. Arb. Case No. 2010-20 (June 30, 
2017). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
2018]  101 
 
claims to investor-state arbitration.  If it does not do so, China may 
find itself, like capital-exporting states in the past, facing a host of 
legal claims by its investors against BRI host governments that may 
otherwise be difficult or burdensome for China to resolve in 
diplomatic channels.  Conversely, if China does amend more of its 
BITs to authorize Chinese investors to submit claims against host 
governments arising out of BRI projects to arbitration, China can 
expect pressure from other governments (involved in BRI or not) to 
demand reciprocal rights in their own BITs with China, thereby 
opening China itself to claims by foreign investors in China.  In 
either case, it seems reasonable to anticipate a significant increase in 
investor-state arbitration involving China. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
China’s BRI will inevitably generate a large number of complex, 
inter-related disputes involving Chinese investments in dozens of 
countries.  Arbitration, both commercial and investor-state, provides 
the most promising procedures for resolving these disputes on terms 
that may be regarded as satisfactory by all parties.  The magnitude 
of China’s proposed BRI investment program will, however, present 
serious challenges to existing arbitral institutions.  It remains to be 
seen whether the current system of independent arbitral institutions 
can handle the potential increase in commercial arbitration and, at 
the same time, avoid becoming enmeshed in the potential political 
pitfalls.  Uncertain, too, is China’s willingness to participate in an 
expanded system of ISDS that can accommodate the inevitable 
investor-state claims that will arise.  In both respects, China’s BRI 
program can be expected to present significant challenges to 
international arbitration. 
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